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ABSTRACT 
I argue that the fairness of a society affects its level of social trust more than does its 
homogeneity. Societies with fair procedural rules (democracy), fair administration of 
rules (freedom from corruption), and fair (relatively equal and unskewed) income 
distribution produce incentives for trustworthy behavior, develop norms of 
trustworthiness, and enhance interpersonal trust. Based on a multi-level analysis using 
the World Values Surveys data that cover 80 countries, I find that (1) freedom from 
corruption, income equality, and mature democracy are positively associated with 
trust, while ethnic diversity loses significance once these factors are accounted for; (2) 
corruption and inequality have an adverse impact on norms and perceptions of 
trustworthiness; (3) the negative effect of inequality on trust is due to the skewness of 
income rather than its simple heterogeneity; and (4) the negative effect of minority 
status is greater in more unequal and undemocratic countries, consistent with the 
fairness explanation.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
According to recent research, social trust, or “generalized interpersonal trust,” 
reduces transaction costs and thus contributes to economic growth, helps to solve 
collective action problems, facilitates civic engagement, and leads to better 
functioning government (Putnam 1993, 2000; Fukuyama 1995; Knack and Keefer 
1997; La Porta et al. 1997).  
Societies vary greatly in their level of social trust, as Table 1 indicates. More than 
65 percent of people in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway agreed that most people can 
be trusted, while only 3 percent of Brazilians did so, according to the recent World 
Values Surveys and European Values Study (Inglehart et al. 1999, 2004). Hence, it is 
of great importance to understand what societies, what kinds of societal conditions, 
and what political and social institutions, lead to higher or lower levels of social trust.  
The term “social trust” (generalized interpersonal trust) should be distinguished 
from “political trust” (confidence in political and public institutions). Social trust, as 
“generalized thin trust,” also should be distinguished from trust embedded in personal 
relations, or “particularized thick trust.” The literature on social trust has looked at 
individual and societal characteristics that may affect social trust. Three kinds of 
individual characteristics have been proposed as determinants of generalized trust: 1) 
civic engagement and organizational membership (Putnam 1993, 2000), 2) 
individuals’ life experiences of becoming winners or losers in society (Newton 1999; 
Putnam 2000: 138), and 3) optimism and sense of control over the future that is 
formed during early socialization (Uslaner 2002).  
Many empirical studies have identified various possible causes of social trust at 
the societal level, but existing explanations are theoretically weak and the empirical 
tests are far from adequate. Economic development, democracy, income equality, 
control of corruption, ethnic homogeneity, and Protestantism have often been found to 
be significantly positively associated with social trust (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; 
Delhey and Newton 2004; Inglehart 1999; La Porta et al. 1997; Leigh 2003; Uslaner 
2002; Zak and Knack 2001). However, the significance of these variables has often 
varied depending on the data, sample, and specification. Moreover, these variables are 
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so closely correlated with each other that it is hard to identify which causes which. 
For example, economic development may be more a consequence than a cause of 
social trust. 
Table 1. Percentage of People Who Agree That Most People Can Be Trusted 
 
country 1995-97     1999-2001 country  1995-97     1999-2001
Denmark 66.5 (64.1) Bangladesh 20.9 23.5 (23.3)
Sweden 59.7 66.3 (63.7) Morocco 23.5 (22.9)
Iran 65.3 (49.6) Israel 23.5 (22.9)
Norway 65.3 Georgia 23.4
Netherlands 59.8 (59.4) Estonia 21.5 22.8 (21.7)
Finland 47.6 58.0 (56.8) Chile 21.9 22.8 (22.2)
China 52.7 54.5 (52.5) Puerto Rico 6.0 22.6 (22.4)
Indonesia 51.6 (45.5) Ghana 22.5
New Zealand 49.1 France 22.2 (21.4)
Japan 46.0 43.1 (39.6) Uruguay 22.1
Belarus 24.1 41.9 (38.0) Hungary 21.8 (21.4)
Taiwan 41.8 Slovenia 15.5 21.7 (21.2)
Viet Nam 41.3 (38.9) Mexico 28.1 21.3 (20.8)
Iceland 41.1 (39.3) Malta 20.7 (20.4)
India 39.2 41.0 (38.9) Azerbaijan 20.5
Switzerland 41.0 Serbia and Montenegro 29.9 19.7 (19.5)
Australia 39.9 Poland 17.9 18.9 (18.9)
Canada 38.8 (38.4) Croatia 23.6 18.4 (17.9)
Egypt 37.9 (37.5) Latvia 24.7 17.1 (16.7)
Spain 29.8 36.2 (34.5) Singapore 16.9 (16.7)
United States 35.6 35.8 (35.5) Venezuela 13.7 15.9 (15.8)
Ireland 35.2 (34.6) Bosnia and Herzegovina 28.3 15.8 (15.6)
Germany 41.8 34.8 (33.1) Turkey 5.5 15.7 (15.5)
Austria 33.9 (31.3) Slovakia 15.7 (15.2)
Italy 32.6 (31.8) Argentina 17.5 15.4 (15.0)
Pakistan 20.6 30.8 (28.2) Moldova 22.2 14.7 (14.1)
Belgium 30.7 (29.4) El Salvador 14.6
Great Britain 29.6 29.7 (28.5) Macedonia 8.2 13.5 (13.1)
Jordan 27.7 (27.1) Zimbabwe 11.9 (11.7)
Korea (South) 30.3 27.3 (27.3) South Africa 18.2 11.8 (11.5)
Ukraine 31.0 27.2 (26.1) Algeria 11.2 (10.8)
Bulgaria 28.6 26.9 (24.9) Colombia 10.8
Dominican Republic 26.4 Peru 5.0 10.7 (10.6)
Luxembourg 26.0 (24.9) Romania 10.1 (9.9)
Nigeria 19.5 25.6 (25.3) Portugal 10.0 (9.8)
Lithuania 22.2 24.9 (23.4) Philippines 5.5 8.4 (8.3)
Armenia 24.7 Tanzania 8.1 (7.7)
Albania 24.4 (23.2) Uganda 7.6 (7.6)
Czech Republic 23.9 (23.4) Brazil 2.8
Greece 23.7 (20.5) Mean 26.4 27.6 (26.4)
Russian Federation 24.1 23.7 (22.9) Std. Dev. 14.0 14.7 (13.5)  
Source: World Values Surveys (1995-97, 2000-01) and European Values Study (1999)   
Note: Countries are listed in the order of rank for the 1999-2001 surveys and then for 
the 1995-97 surveys. Entries are percentages of respondents who chose to agree that 
most people can be trusted “among the respondents who answered the trust question,” 
weighted by sampling weights. For the 1999-2001 surveys, entries in parentheses are 
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percentages of trusting respondents “among the whole interviewees including those 
who did not answer the trust question.” For example, in Iran many interviewees did 
not answer the question, and the two percentages are substantially different. Arguably, 
the level of social trust in Iran may be better represented by the percentage in 
parenthesis. 
 
Democracy and social trust are strongly correlated with each other, and Booth and 
Bayer (1998:43) found that repressive governments discouraged trust. However, 
Inglehart (1999) found that democracy lost significance when per capita income and 
religious traditions were included in the explanatory variables. Regarding the effect of 
corruption, conflicting findings exist. Seligson (2002) demonstrated, through 
individual-level analysis of surveys of four Latin American countries, that exposure to 
corruption not only erodes confidence in the political system but also reduces 
interpersonal trust. Zak and Knack (2001) found corruption significant across 
countries, but Uslaner (2002, 2004) found it insignificant and argued that causation 
runs from trust to freedom from corruption and not from corruption to trust.  
Income equality and racial/ethnic homogeneity were most often found to be 
significant. Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) proposed “similarity/dissimilarity 
explanation”, or “aversion to heterogeneity” theory. They argue that it is easier to trust 
similar people than dissimilar people in terms of income, race, ethnicity, etc. Their 
explanation has created a great deal of anxiety among many scholars and policy 
makers, in particular those who advocate cultural diversity and the welfare state. 
Since social trust is often regarded as necessary for the support for the welfare state, 
support for ethnic and cultural diversity might jeopardize the welfare state (Van Parijs 
2004; Pearce 2004). So, it was termed a new “progressive dilemma” (Pearce 2004). 
The “aversion to heterogeneity” explanation implies that trust should be lower in 
more diverse and heterogeneous societies in terms of racial, ethnic, linguistic, or 
religious composition as well as income and wealth. However, Delhey and Newton 
(2004) find that linguistic and religious homogeneity is not associated with social 
trust across countries, while ethnic homogeneity is. Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) 
find that “ethnic fragmentation” (based on 10 categories of ethnic/national origin) is 
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not correlated with distrust in the US, while “racial fragmentation” (along the five 
racial categories of the Census) is highly significant. These facts raise a question 
about what determines the salience of certain differences since there are a large 
number of traits that distinguish people.  
Even more puzzling is the finding that trust within own racial group as well as 
interracial trust is substantially lower in racially diverse communities, according to the 
Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey conducted in the US (Saguaro Seminar 
2001). The similarity explanation does not explain why trust among Whites as well as 
trust among Blacks goes down as the percentage of Blacks increases. Also, it is 
questionable to interpret the negative effect of income inequality as being caused by 
its simple heterogeneity. Income inequality may not be reduced to its simple 
dissimilarities, and perhaps other aspects of inequality such as unfairness or 
exploitation may be real causes of distrust. 
Considering the inherent difficulty of sorting out causal directions with statistical 
analysis, it is of great importance to establish a better theory of social trust that 
illuminates the causal mechanisms. Empirical analysis needs to go beyond testing and 
identifying variables that are significant controlling for other plausible covariates. 
Competing theories should be made falsifiable, and multiple implications and causal 
mechanisms need to be empirically tested.  
In this paper, I present a new theory of social trust, the “fairness explanation”, 
which posits that fair societies in terms of distributive, procedural, and formal justice 
tend to encourage trustworthy behavior as well as trust in others. The fairness idea is 
not totally new. Rothstein and Stolle (2003) argued that procedural fairness 
encourages social trust, and Uslaner (2004) also linked trust with fairness. Building on 
their insights, I develop a more comprehensive theory about why and how various 
aspects of social justice affect social trust, emphasizing the role of political and legal 
institutions.  
I test multiple implications of my theory against the predictions of the similarity 
explanation through a variety of statistical analyses across the sample of 80 countries 
included in the World Values Surveys and European Values Study (1995-97 and 
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1999-2001). In particular, I make a methodological contribution by employing 
multi-level statistical analysis and multiple imputation of missing data that were not 
used in the previous studies of social trust, to my knowledge.  
In the next two sections, I present the “fairness explanation” and compare it with 
the “similarity explanation.” I describe the data and methods in section 4.  Empirical 
findings and interpretations from my statistical work are presented in section 5.  The 
final section summarizes and concludes with discussion of some research and policy 
implications. 
 
II. TRUST, TRUSTWORTHINESS, AND FAIRNESS OF SOCIETY  
Person A’s trust in person B typically reflects A’s past experience with B’s 
trustworthiness. Since trusting can be both beneficial and costly, A will use the 
available information about B’s integrity (intention to keep his/her promises), 
competence (ability to produce promised outcomes), and fairness (equal and impartial 
treatment for similar cases). For the vast majority of people, however, we do not know 
them personally and hence cannot decide whether to trust them. So, a person’s trust in 
“other people in general” will reflect his/her direct and indirect experiences of 
trustworthiness of other people. Early socialization will be affected by parents’ 
experiences with the trustworthiness of other people. Thus, the level of social trust in 
a society will reflect the collective experience of the overall trustworthiness of others.  
Also, trust will produce greater trustworthiness. Distrusting people are less likely 
to cooperate in collective action problems. If you believe most other people are 
evading taxes, you are also likely to cheat on your taxes. Thus, trust and 
trustworthiness mutually reinforce each other (Putnam 2000: 137). Hence a theory of 
social trust should be able to explain what makes people act in a trustworthy manner 
as well as what makes people trust other people. 
Hardin (1998) argues, “My trust in you is typically encapsulated in your interest in 
fulfilling my trust”, and “if public officials are to be trusted, they must have interest in 
fulfilling the trust placed in them.” Organizations can give role holders incentives for 
trustworthiness, and we can trust them because of institutional arrangements that 
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make dishonesty risky and reward honesty. Different legal institutions can create 
different incentives for trustworthiness. However, human behavior is determined not 
simply by material incentives but also by values, norms, and perceptions (March and 
Olson 1989). Different institutional arrangements and social conditions can produce 
different norms about trustworthiness such as intolerance of corruption and cheating 
as unacceptable behavior. Perceptions also matter. If people perceive that most other 
people are cheating, they are more likely to justify their own cheating. 
Levi (1998) and Rothstein and Stolle (2003) emphasized the role of the 
government and political institutions in generating social trust. Levi (1998) suggested 
that important characteristics of a state capable of producing interpersonal trust would 
be the capacity to monitor laws, to impose sanctions on lawbreakers, and to provide 
information and guarantees about those seeking to be trusted. Rothstein and Stolle 
(2003) argued that procedural fairness encourages social trust, and specifically 
selective welfare programs, unlike universal welfare programs, erode social trust by 
encouraging cheating and corruption. Uslaner (2004) also linked trust and fairness, 
arguing that inequality erodes trust and that distrust increases corruption.  
Using Rawls’s concepts of three kinds of “justice as fairness” (Rawls 1971), I 
argue that fair societies in terms of distributive, procedural, and formal justice 
generally produce more material incentives for, and norms of, trustworthiness. Fair 
rules that reward trustworthiness and punish untrustworthiness and fair administration 
of rules will increase incentives for trustworthy behavior, and hence reduce the costs 
of trust. Societies with fair rules and fair administration will more likely cause people 
to respect the rules and produce norms encouraging trustworthiness. Fairness of 
distributive outcomes will affect the sense of fairness, and thereby perceptions of 
trustworthiness. Thus, fairness of political and legal institutions will not only affect 
political trust, or confidence in public institutions, but also generalized interpersonal 
trust. This also implies that social trust will be positively correlated with political trust, 
although some previous literature found the independence of social trust from 
political trust (Norris 2002: 160-61). 
1) Formal justice and freedom from corruption: Rawls (1971) defined ‘formal 
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justice’ as “impartial and consistent administration of laws and institutions”, whatever 
their substantive principles are. It implies equal treatment before the law. Corruption, 
as a violation of obligations of fairness for private gain, is obviously a breach of 
formal justice, and it involves betrayal of public trust placed in officials to act fairly 
and impartially. Although corrupt transactions require trust between corrupt actors, it 
is not “generalized interpersonal trust” but “particularized trust” based on exchange of 
benefits at the expense of other honest players while betraying the trust of the general 
public. 
Why will corruption erode trust in other people in general, not just trust in public 
officials? Corrupt transactions typically involve private actors as well as public 
officials. When the rule of law is weak and corruption is rampant, both public officials 
and private actors have greater incentive to engage in corruption, cheating, and fraud 
because the expected costs of such untrustworthy behavior (eg., the probability and 
severity of punishment) usually decrease. Hence, trust becomes more costly because 
the other party may cheat without being punished.  
Corruption will also affect norms about corruption. If people perceive they are 
surrounded by corruption, they may feel they have to accept and even participate in 
corruption. As corrupt practices spread and become habitual as “how things are done”, 
the norm of corruption is transmitted to subsequent generations (You and Khagram 
2005). Thus, corruption breeds corruption, and a sense of unfairness discourages both 
trust and trustworthiness.  
2) Procedural justice and democracy: The key principles of procedural justice 
are equal liberties and fair equality of opportunity, according to Rawls (1971). 
Democratic countries that guarantee all citizens equal political and civil rights and 
equal opportunity to seek public offices should produce more incentives for trust and 
trustworthiness, because people can hold untrustworthy officials accountable through 
elections and various mechanisms of checks and balances. Moreover, democratic 
forms of governance may spread over time into corporations, schools, and many other 
organizations that affect people’s everyday lives. People tend to perceive the same 
outcome as fairer when they have participated in the process which produced it and 
 9
when everyone has been given equal rights (Lind and Tyler 1988). Thus, democracy is 
likely to enhance not only political trust but also social trust. 
However, democracies, especially new democracies, also produce new incentives 
for corruption as political financing needs increase (Rose-Ackerman 1999). 
Previously unexposed corruption and misbehaviors of the powerful and the rich are 
more likely to be exposed, leading to higher perceived levels of corruption and 
untrustworthiness. In addition, early periods of democratization can produce more 
political and social conflicts and struggles, which were contained under authoritarian 
regimes. Thus, mature and stable democracy and early and partial democracy may 
have quite different effects on social trust.  
3) Distributive justice and income equality: Distributive justice requires fair 
distributive rules and fair distributive outcomes. But it is not easy to agree as to what 
fair distribution means, and perfectly equal distribution is not necessarily fair. Rawls 
(1971) proposed that unequal distribution that is to the benefit of the least advantaged 
is just. Miller (1992) noted that people judge distributive justice using three criteria: 
equality, desert (merit), and need. Although income equality and fairness should be 
conceptually distinguished, one could still use income inequality as a proxy for 
distributive justice. In most existing capitalist societies, too much equality is rarely a 
problem of justice, although in former communist countries the mandated equality 
would not have been perceived as fair because hard work was not rewarded and 
shirking was common. Merit-based distribution will produce inequality, but excessive 
inequality may not be justified even by merit criterion.  
As the income gap between the rich and poor increases, everyone may have 
greater incentive for cheating and corruption because the expected benefit of such 
action increases, other things being equal. In particular, the rich can use more 
resources for corruption to their own benefit at higher levels of inequality. Thus, a 
higher income gap may produce higher cheating and corruption, and hence lower 
trust. 
However, distributive justice may be better captured by skewness rather than by 
dispersion (income gap). If the distribution is close to normal, then most of the people 
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are located around the mean with some very rich and very poor people in the tails.  
In that case, a substantial degree of income inequality may not pose a problem of 
fairness if everyone infers from the normal distribution that they have equal life 
chances. However, highly skewed distribution is likely to be (perceived as) unfair, 
where most people are poor and few people have a large share of national income. 
Merit-based distribution will not likely produce highly skewed distribution, assuming 
that the distribution of skill and effort is approximately normal.  
Skewed distribution may be a result of a history or legal system of concentrated 
ownership, exploitation, discrimination, and/or corruption by the rich, and most poor 
people are likely to believe that the rules of the game are unfair and many people act 
unfairly. Poorer people are more likely to believe they are “unjustly under-rewarded,” 
while richer people are more likely to think they are “justly rewarded” (Jasso 1980). 
Also, the rich are more likely to be treated nicely by most people, perhaps because 
people may regard the relationships with richer people possibly more valuable for the 
future (Putnam 2000:138). Since higher skewness means a higher proportion of poor 
people, the proportion of people who regard the distribution unfair will increase with 
skewness. The sense of unfairness may convince many poor people that they cannot 
become rich by just means, and they may justify their own involvement in petty 
corruption and cheating. Thus, untrustworthy behaviors spread throughout the whole 
society and social trust declines accordingly.  
In addition, as income distribution becomes more skewed to the right, more 
people are relatively poor, and the median income becomes smaller than the mean 
income. The median  voter’s and the large number of poor people’s subsequent 
demand for higher redistribution and higher taxation for the rich will give the rich 
greater incentive for corruption and illegal purchase of political influence to reduce 
tax rates and to evade taxes (You and Khagram 2005). Thus, skewness will be 
associated with higher corruption and lower social trust. 
 
III. FAIRNESS OR SIMILARITY: COMPETING HYPOTHESES 
The similarity explanation is fundamentally related to perceptions, whereas the 
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fairness explanation considers material incentives as well. People can be suspicious of 
others of a different race or ethnicity because of prejudice even when the others are in 
fact trustworthy. In addition, one could argue that homogeneous societies may have a 
better chance of developing fair rules and institutions than heterogeneous societies. 
Thus, the similarity explanation may go together with the fairness explanation. 
Unlike the similarity explanation, it is notable that the fairness explanation can 
explain the impact of corruption and democracy on trust and trustworthiness. The 
fairness explanation can also explain why political trust, or confidence in public 
institutions, is positively associated with social trust. If public institutions and public 
officials are trustworthy, private actors are more likely to observe the rules of the 
game and people’s sense of fairness and generalized trust also will likely increase.  
The fairness explanation incorporates the “winner vs. loser” explanation at the 
individual level. Unfair and discriminatory rules or unfair administration of rules 
will produce a large number of losers, and the poor will regard themselves as losers 
in unequal societies. The losers, especially those who lose big or repeatedly, may 
actually be the victims of unfair rules and practices, or they will likely suspect that 
the rules of the game are unfair or the rules are being administered unfairly. 
According to the psychological literature on attribution theory, people tend to 
attribute their successes to their own merits but attribute their failures to external 
factors (Martinko 1995). Thus, losers are less likely to trust others. 
More importantly, there are some important questions about which the two 
theories make contradictory predictions. Although both theories expect income 
inequality to be negatively associated with trust and trustworthiness, there are 
important differences. First, the two theories generate different predictions as to 
whether the poor, the rich, or the middle income class will be more trusting. The 
fairness explanation, together with the “winner vs. loser” explanation, predicts that the 
rich (winners) will be more trusting than the poor (losers). Since the rich are more 
likely to think they deserve their richness and are “justly rewarded,” they are more 
likely to perceive that the society is fair and that most people act fairly. On the other 
hand, the similarity explanation should predict that people in the middle of income 
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distribution will have the highest level of trust because of the concentration of people 
within this economically homogeneous grouping, while the rich will have lowest 
levels of trust because their income levels are different from most of the people, 
especially under a skewed distribution.   
Second, the skewness effect is predicted totally differently. Figure 1 illustrates 
two societies with the same level of income dispersion but with normal and skewed 
distribution, respectively. The logic of the similarity explanation implies that the 
society with skewed distribution should have a higher level of social trust, because 
most people are poor, and hence they will trust most other people who are also poor. 
However, the fairness explanation predicts differently. Higher skewness reflects 
greater unfairness and/or is perceived to be more unfair, and should be associated with 
a lower level of generalized trust.  
 
Figure 1. Normal vs. Skewed Distribution
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Third, the effect of ethnic and cultural diversity may depend not just on the 
degree of diversity but on the fairness of ethnic relations. The salience of ethnic 
heterogeneity may depend on the degree of economic inequality and political 
inequality and on how closely the ethnic lines overlap with these inequalities. Also, 
the effect of being a minority may depend on whether and how much the minority 
group has suffered discrimination. Social- psychological studies on interracial contact 
provide support to these hypotheses. More interracial contact can lead either to greater 
acceptance and trust or to greater prejudice and distrust, depending upon the situation 
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in which it occurs. For example, equal-status contact generally reduces prejudice, but 
unequal-status contact increases prejudice (Pettigrew 1971: 275-6).  
Table 2 summarizes the competing hypotheses based on the fairness and 
similarity explanations. By testing causal mechanisms and multiple implications of 
competing theories, we can avoid spurious findings. 
 
Table 2. Fairness vs. similarity explanation: Competing hypotheses 
 
  Fairness Explanation Similarity Explanation 
(1) Skewness Skewness causes lower trust.  Skewness causes higher trust.
(2) Income effect The richer are more likely to be 
trusting. 
People in the middle of the 
distribution are most trusting. 
(3)Ethnic/Cultural
Diversity 
Depends on the fairness of the 
ethnic relations and the whole 
society. 
  Negative 
(4)Minority effect Negative, but depends on fairness 
of the society. 
Negative 
(5) Democracy Democracy increases trust in the 
long run. 
No prediction 
(6) Corruption Corruption destroys trust. No prediction 
(7) Political 
Trust 
Political trust is positively 
associated with social trust 
No prediction 
(8) Norms & 
Perceptions 
Fair societies enhance norms and 
perceptions of trustworthiness. 
Homogeneous societies 
increase perceptions of 
trustworthiness. 
 
IV. DATA  AND METHODS 
1) Micro Data: For individual-level variables, I used data from the World Values 
Surveys (1995-1997 and 2000-2001) and the European Values Study (1999-2000) 
(Inglehart et al. 1999, 2004). The two surveys used virtually identical questionnaires 
and survey methodologies. The usable data for the purpose of this study contains 
176,307 individuals in 80 countries on all continents of the world.  
Social trust is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 for those who agreed that 
“most people can be trusted,” and 0 for those who chose to answer that “you can’t be 
too careful” (WVS 1995-97 and EVS 1999) or “you need to be very careful”(WVS 
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2000-2001) in dealing with people. Although the slightly different wordings for the 
second answer did not seem to produce large differences in average responses 
between the 1995-97 WVS and the 2000-01 WVS, the change of wording might have 
made differences in some countries. Political trust (scale: 1 to 4) is the average level 
of confidence in seven public institutions: the armed forces, the legal system, the 
police, the central government, political parties, parliament, and the civil service. This 
variable takes the value of 1 for “none at all", 2 for “not very much”, 3 for “quite a 
lot”, and 4 for “a great deal” of confidence in each institution. 
There are some concerns about the cross-cultural comparability of questions about 
social trust. The meaning of trust may be somewhat different across cultures and the 
expression “can’t be too careful” may be confusing or hard to translate for some 
languages.  Yamagishi et al. (1999) argued that being careful does not necessarily 
mean lack of trust and that this trust question is not well-designed. Glaeser et al. 
(2000) raised another issue. In their experimental study, those individuals who 
answered that most people can be trusted did not act as if they trusted others, although 
they acted in a trustworthy manner. Thus, they raised the possibility that the WVS 
type trust question is better at capturing trustworthiness rather than trust.  
However, their finding can be interpreted to mean that trust and trustworthiness 
are closely correlated so that trusting people tend to act in a trustworthy manner. 
Knack and Keefer (1997) also provided an experimental finding that social trust, 
measured by the percentage of people who agreed that most people can be trusted, is 
strikingly closely correlated across countries and regions with the number of wallets 
that were lost and subsequently returned with their contents intact. In addition, it 
should be noted that inferring trust from a person’s behavior is more difficult than 
inferring trustworthiness because it is harder to read someone’s mind than to judge 
someone’s actions.  
In spite of concerns about cross-cultural comparability and reliability of 
WVS/EVS data, the trust question seems to reflect both trust and trustworthiness to a 
considerable degree. It is the best available data on social trust that covers a large 
number of countries and has been used by previous empirical studies. Large 
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measurement error in social trust will make standard errors large and some 
explanatory variables may lose significance while they are in fact significant. The 
good news is that it is not likely to produce bias, assuming the measurement error is 
not correlated with the independent variables.1  
Income (1 to 10) refers to a subjective assessment of one’s household income on a 
scale of 10 income groups, and Education (1 to 6) denotes six categories from “no 
formal education” to “university-level education, with degree”.2 The dummy variable 
Minority represents a respondent being a member of an ethnic minority in her or his 
country. Perceived extent of corruption (scale: 1 to 4) denotes how widespread a 
respondent thinks bribe taking and corruption are in the respondent’s country. This 
variable is available for only the WVS conducted in 1995-97. Voluntary membership 
(0 to 1) is the normalized number of memberships in various kinds of voluntary 
organizations. Descriptive statistics of the individual-level variables and their 
correlations with “social trust” are presented in the upper panel of Table A1 in the 
Appendix.  
2) Macro Data: As a measure of (perceived level of) “freedom from corruption”, 
I use Kaufmann et al.’s (2003) Control of Corruption Indicator (CCI, average for 1996 
and 1998). It is based on various sources of survey data that reflect the opinions of 
international business people and country experts, but it turns out to be -0.85 
correlated with the domestic public’s “perceived extent of corruption” from the WVS 
(1995-97). The correlation is negative because a higher CCI value represents a lower 
level of corruption. 
I use three different measures of income inequality. Gini coefficients are the most 
commonly used measure of income inequality. Averaged for 1971-96, the coefficients 
were adjusted to make comparable across different definitions of gini such as the 
income-based and expenditure-based gini by You and Khagram (2005). Since the 
effect of inequality on social trust is likely to be a long-term effect, and single year 
                                                        
1 Measurement error in the dependent variable causes inefficiency, but it does not produce 
bias if it is uncorrelated with explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2002) 
2 The education variable has nine and eight categories in the 1995-97 and 1999-2001 surveys, 
respectively. I applied a consistent criterion to the data to make them comparable. 
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data is likely to contain large measurement errors, it is better to use the averaged data 
for a long period. I constructed variables measuring dispersion (income gap) and 
skewness of income distribution to see whether the inequality effect is driven by 
dispersion or skewness. Natural log of “20/20 ratio”, or the ratio of the top quintile 
income to the bottom quintile income, will be used as a measure of dispersion. 
Natural log of “mean/median ratio”, proxied by the ratio of mean income to the 
average income of the third quintile, will be used as a measure of skewness. They are 
also averaged for the period of 1971-96. 
For ethnic and cultural diversity, I use Ethnic fractionalization and Cultural 
fractionalization data constructed by Fearon (2003), and ethnic, linguistic, and 
religious fractionalization data created by Alesina et al. (2003). The measure of ethnic 
fractionalization is given by the probability that two randomly drawn individuals of a 
country belong to two different ethnic groups. Thus, as fractionalization increases 
from zero to one, everyone in the society should be surrounded by a larger proportion 
of dissimilar people. Fearon’s cultural fractionalization data take into account cultural 
distance between ethnic groups as well, where cultural proximity is measured by the 
number of common classifications in the language tree. 
As a measure of degree of democracy, I use Freedom House’s Political rights 
score (averaged for 1972-96). 3  As a measure of the age of democracy, I use 
Consecutive years of democracy (since 1950, up to 1995) based on the classification 
of Alvarez et al. (1996),4 which ranges from 0 to 46 (Treisman 2000). The level of 
economic development will be represented by the Natural log of GDP per capita (in 
1995 constant US dollars; averaged for 1971-96; from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators). Descriptive statistics of the country-level variables and their 
                                                        
3 The original scores were converted such that a higher score represents more freedom. For 
countries that became independent after the collapse of the Soviet Union and other former 
communist regimes, the political rights score for the former regimes was applied for the 
period before independence. The civil rights scores of the Freedom House contain an element 
of corruption, so I did not use them. 
4 Alvarez et al. consider a country democratic if the chief executive and the legislature are 
elected through the contestation by more than one party and if there has been at least one 
turnover of power between the parties during the last three elections of a chief executive. 
Treisman (2000) extended the Alvarez et al. data up to 1995.   
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correlation with “mean social trust” (the average percentage of trusting respondents in 
each country from the WVS/EVS in 1995-97 and 1999-2001) are presented in the 
lower panel of Table A1 in the Appendix.  
3) Methods: I will employ a two-level hierarchical non-linear model to estimate 
how much individual-level factors and country-level factors affect individuals’ 
probability of trusting others as well as how country-level factors influence the effects 
of individual-level factors on social trust. Hierarchical models allow level-1 
(individual-level) intercepts and coefficients to vary randomly across level-2 units 
(countries) and/or to be explained by level-2 variables.  
Hierarchical models not only enable richer analysis but also solve statistical 
problems that conventional methods face. To run a probit or logit regression including 
country-level variables and interaction terms between individual-level variables and 
country-level variables would overlook characteristics of the error structure, because 
country-level predictors do not fully account for cross-country differences in the 
intercept and slopes of individual-level variables.5 Hierarchical models explicitly 
incorporate both individual-level and group-level errors and combine multiple levels 
of analysis in a single comprehensive model by specifying predictors at different 
levels (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Steenbergen and Jones 2002).6  
Problems of missing data often are very serious and may cause bias in 
cross-country empirical studies as well as in analyses of survey data. In order to 
alleviate this problem and to use the maximum available information, I employed the 
method of multiple imputation for the missing data (Allison 2002; King et al. 2001).7 
Without multiple imputation, I would have lost a great deal of valuable information 
                                                        
5 Interactive models incorporate random error only at the individual level of analysis and 
assume that the error components are zero at the country level of analysis, which is unrealistic. 
Another conventional method uses country dummies to absorb the variation across countries, 
but this method cannot explain the differences in intercept and slopes of individual-level 
variables using country-level variables (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). 
6 I used the HLM 5 program for the hierarchical logit model of analysis. 
7 Multiple imputation involves imputing m values for each missing item and creating m 
completed data sets. The imputation model should contain at least as much information as the 
analysis model. I used King et al.’s software, “Amelia” (http://GKing.Harvard.Edu, accessed 
on 09/20/2004), for multiple imputation. I ran the same logit regressions for ten imputed data 
sets and combined the results to produce a single set of estimates for each model according to 
the formula suggested by King et al. (2001). 
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from a number of observations in the analysis. This is particularly important because 
the conventional method of “listwise deletion” would substantially reduce the number 
of countries in the sample, which could cause selection bias. Many previous 
cross-country studies of social trust relied on too small sample size to generalize their 
findings.  
 By combining the WVS/EVS data for 1995-97 and 1999-2001 and employing 
multiple imputation for missing data, I was able, to the best of my knowledge, to 
conduct my analysis on the largest number of countries among cross-national studies 
of social trust. The correlation between the country means of social trust for the two 
waves of data is as high as 0.86, so pooled analysis is warranted and it may help 
reduce measurement error at the country level.  
 
V. RESULTS 
1) Multi-level analysis of correlates of social trust: Table 3 presents the results 
of two-level hierarchical non-linear models with a logit link function predicting the 
probability of trusting with individual-level (level-1, hereafter) and country-level 
(level-2, hereafter) variables. With multiple imputation for missing values for both 
level-1 and level-2 data I was able to use the full available information for 176,307 
individuals in 80 countries.8 Both the level-1 intercept and several level-1 slopes (or 
coefficients) are explained by level-2 variables, and both the level-1 equation and 
level-2 equations have a random error term. I report the results of two models, and 
each model has one level-1 equation and multiple level-2 equations. Model 1 is the 
base model, and it has the following level-1 equation: 
Log [P/(1-P)] = β0 + β1 (Age) + β2 (Age2) + β3 (Income) + β4 (Education) + β5 
(Female) + β6 (Unemployed) + β7 (Rural) + β8 (Minority) + β9 (Catholic) + β10 
(Protestant) + β11 (Orthodox) + β12 (Muslim) + β13 (Other Religion),  
--------------------------------------------- (1) 
                                                        
8 Without multiple imputation of missing data, the usable observations in the multi-level 
analysis would be just 45,739 individuals in 31 countries in models 1 and 2, and 44,347 
individuals in 29 countries in model 3. 
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where P denotes the probability of trusting, and Age, Age2, Income, and 
Education are centered around the group mean. For example, Age=age – mean (age), 
for each country.  
Level-2 equations are as follows.  
β0 = λ00 + λ01 (GINI) + λ02 (Control of Corruption) + λ03 (Political Rights) + λ04 
(Political Rights2) + λ05 (ln GDP per capita) + λ06 (Ethnic Fractionalization) + ε0, 
---------------------- (2) 
βk = λk0 + εk, for k=1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, and13, 
------------------------------------------ (3) 
βk = λk0 + λk1 (ln GDP per capita), for k=3, 4, and 7, 
---------------------------------------- (4) 
β8 = λ80 + λ81 (GINI) + λ82 (Control of Corruption) + λ83 (Political Rights) + λ84 
(ln GDP per capita) + λ85 (Ethnic Fractionalization), 
-------------------------------------------------------- (5) 
where all the level-2 variables are centered around the grand mean. For example, 
GINI = gini - mean (gini), within the sample of 80 countries. The random error terms, 
ε0 and εk, have normal distribution with mean of zero and variance of σ02 and σk2, 
respectively, i.e., ε0 ~ N(0,σ02) and εk ~ N(0,σk2), for k=5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13. σk 
is set to zero for k=1, 2.9  
The intercept (λ00) represents the expected log odds of trusting for a typical male 
(who has mean age, income and education within a country, is not unemployed, lives 
in a city, is not a minority, and has no religion) in a typical country (with mean values 
of level-2 variables and the error term of zero, i.e., ε0 = 0). This conditional expected 
log odds is -1.0835, corresponding to a probability of 1/{1+exp(1.0835)} = 0.2528. 
Thus, the probability of trusting for a typical man in a typical country is predicted to 
be 25.3 per cent. 
The effects of level-1 variables are generally consistent with previous findings. 
                                                        
9 Ideally βk should have random error term for k= 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, and 8 as well. However, the 
data do not allow the HLM 5 program to estimate the error term for all level-1 coefficients. 
Since these coefficients have relatively small variance components, I constrained their error 
term to be zero. 
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Winners in society such as people with higher income and higher education are 
significantly more likely to trust, and losers such as people in a minority or 
unemployed are substantially less likely to trust. Moving up one step on the income 
ladder of ten income groups increases the log odds of trusting for a typical male in a 
country with average per capita income by 0.0404,10 which would result in the 
probability of trusting of 1/{1+exp(1.0835-0.0404)} =0.2606. Thus, moving up one 
income group is associated with 0.8 percent increase in the propensity to trust others, 
controlling for other individual-level and country-level factors.  
Females are significantly less trusting on average. Age has a slight non-linear 
effect, but generally older people are more trusting.11 Rural residents are significantly 
more trusting. Protestants are significantly more trusting than people with no religion. 
It should be noted that the level-1 coefficients vary substantially across countries. For 
example, the equation for “Female” slope is β5 = -0.0455 + ε5, where ε5 ~ N(0, 
0.0118). Hence the plausible value range for Female slope is -0.0455 ± 1.96 * 
(0.0118)0.5 = -0.0455 ± 0.2129 = (-0.2584, 0.1674).12
                                                        
10 Note that the slope for subjective income varies across countries, depending on per capita 
income. The income effect is greater in richer countries. 
11 The coefficients for Age and Age2 indicate that trust increases up to the age of 89 (or 70, 
according to the model 2) other things being equal, but at a decreasing rate as age increases. 
12 The corresponding plausible value range of probability of trusting for a typical female is 
from 1/{1+exp(1.0835+0.2584)} =0.2072 to 1/{1+exp(1.0835-0.1674)} =0.2858. 
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Table 3. Two-Level Hiearchical Logit Model Results of Correlates of Social Trust
            Model 1                      Model 2                     Model 3          
Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Individual-level effects:
Intercept -1.0835 (0.0688) *** -1.0844 (0.0653) *** -1.0609 (0.0668) ***
Political trust 0.2954 (0.0211) ***
Age 0.0070 (0.0019) *** 0.0070 (0.0019) *** 0.0083 (0.0019) ***
Age squared -0.000039 (0.000021) -0.000034 (0.000021) -0.000059 (0.000021) **
Subjective Income 0.0404 (0.0030) *** 0.0405 (0.0031) *** 0.0403 (0.0030) ***
Education 0.1016 (0.0043) *** 0.1016 (0.0044) *** 0.1068 (0.0044) ***
Female -0.0455 (0.0175) ** -0.0429 (0.0174) * -0.0472 (0.0171) **
Unemployed -0.1271 (0.0294) *** -0.1266 (0.0298) *** -0.1110 (0.0287) ***
Rural 0.0793 (0.0140) *** 0.0790 (0.0142) *** 0.0623 (0.0141) ***
Minority -0.2049 (0.0298) *** -0.2042 (0.0313) *** -0.2079 (0.0297) ***
Catholic -0.0275 (0.0393) -0.0208 (0.0398) -0.0487 (0.0406)
Protestant 0.1173 (0.0526) * 0.1210 (0.0526) * 0.0669 (0.0528)
Orthodox -0.1104 (0.0625) -0.0985 (0.0629) -0.1174 (0.0589) *
Muslim 0.0965 (0.0690) 0.0927 (0.0684) 0.0435 (0.0727)
Other Religion 0.1392 (0.0465) ** 0.1308 (0.0468) ** 0.1127 (0.0472) **
No Religion (Reference category)
Country-level effects:
a. On intercept
Gini -2.5165 (0.6216) *** -2.3212 (0.6783) ***
ln (mean/median) -1.5430 (0.6851) *
ln (20/20 ratio) -0.0477 (0.2108)
Control of Corruption 0.2417 (0.1174) * 0.1338 (0.1153) 0.2282 (0.1146) *
Political Rights -0.8719 (0.2241) *** -0.6327 (0.2203) ** -0.7623 (0.2292) **
Pol Rights^2 0.1060 (0.0249) *** 0.0848 (0.0241) *** 0.0901 (0.0262) ***
ln GDP per capita -0.1347 (0.0818) -0.0645 (0.0805) -0.1011 (0.0768)
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.1547 (0.2772) -0.1533 (0.2588) -0.0340 (0.2810)
Catholic Population -0.5995 (0.1677) ***
b. On income effect
ln GDP per capita 0.0127 (0.0019) *** 0.0127 (0.0019) *** 0.0123 (0.0019) ***
c. On education effect
ln GDP per capita 0.0717 (0.0029) *** 0.0717 (0.0029) *** 0.0694 (0.0029) ***
d. On rural effect
ln GDP per capita -0.0190 (0.0096) * -0.0188 (0.0098) -0.0163 (0.0097)
e. On minority effect
Gini -0.5951 (0.2973) * -0.5519 (0.3206) -0.4538 (0.2946)
Control of Corruption -0.0275 (0.0481) -0.0286 (0.0492) -0.0362 (0.0481)
Political Rights 0.0532 (0.0212) * 0.0547 (0.0217) * 0.0485 (0.0215) *
ln GDP per capita -0.1004 (0.0346) ** -0.1011 (0.0346) ** -0.0900 (0.0344) **
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.0772 (0.1295) 0.0825 (0.1343) 0.0894 (0.1280)  
Variance Components for Model 1:
Intercept 0.3362 Unemployed 0.0160 Protestant 0.0908 Muslim 0.1139
Female 0.0118 Catholic 0.0629 Orthodox 0.0941 Other Religion 0.0544
Note : Sample size: 176,307 individuals, 80 countries. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p<.05,  ** p<.01,  *** p<.001  
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This means that in some countries a typical female can be 4.6 percent less trusting 
than a typical male, while in other countries a typical female can be 3.3 percent more 
trusting than a typical male. Although females are significantly less trusting on 
average within the sample of 80 countries, there is substantial variation in the female 
effect across countries.13 An important task of the multi-level analysis is to explain 
the variations in the level-1 intercept and slopes with level-2 variables. 
We see that some level-2 variables have significant explanatory power for the 
level-1 intercept, or the log odds of trusting for a typical man. Income inequality 
(Gini) and control of corruption have significant effects on the probability of a typical 
man trusting others across countries, and political rights score has a significant 
non-linear effect, controlling for individual characteristics and per capita income and 
ethnic diversity. Although per capita income and ethnic diversity have significant 
simple correlations with social trust at the country level (See Table A1 in the 
Appendix), they are insignificant when inequality, corruption, and democracy are 
accounted for. Together these level-2 variables explain a considerable part (about 43 
percent) of the variation in the level-1 intercept, or the probability of a typical man 
trusting others, across countries.14
The coefficient for GINI of -2.5165 means that the increase of gini by 0.1 
(roughly equivalent to one standard deviation) would reduce the log odds of trusting 
for a typical male by -0.2516, which would result in the probability of trusting of 
1/{1+exp(1.0835+0.2516)} =0.2083. Thus, the probability of trusting for a typical 
man decreases by 4.5 percent as the gini coefficient increases by 0.1. Similarly, the 
increase of the Control of Corruption Indicator by 1 (equivalent to one standard 
deviation) would increase the probability of trusting for a typical man by 4.8 percent. 
Thus, both income inequality and corruption have substantively important negative 
effects on social trust, even after political rights, per capita income, and ethnic 
                                                        
13 Running OLS regressions separately for each country gives a rough sense of how much 
variation exists for the coefficient for each level-1 variable across countries.  
14 The error term of equation 2 ( ε0) has a variance of 0.3265 in model 1. ε0 has a variance of 
0.5726 when level-1 intercept is not explained and just allowed to randomly vary across 
countries. Thus, model 1 explains (0.5726-0.3265)/0.5726 = 0.43 of the variation. 
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diversity as well as individual differences have been accounted for. 
The effect of the political rights score (scale of 1 to 7) on social trust is negative 
up to the score of 4.1 (roughly equivalent to the mean political rights score), but 
positive for higher scores. Trust seems to decline with partial democratization, but 
increase with full democracy.  When the political rights score was replaced by the 
“age of democracy” (consecutive years of democracy since 1950), the non-linear 
effect was also significant. Democracy seems to have  a negative effect on social 
trust in the short run, but a positive effect in the long run, consistent with Uslaner’s 
(2002) finding that democracy produces a positive effect only after 46 years of 
continuous democracy.  
Variations in several level-1 slopes are partly explained by level-2 variables. Most 
importantly, the minority effect varies depending on income inequality, political rights, 
and per capita income. Being a minority in a typical country reduces the log odds of 
trusting by 0.2049, and the corresponding probability is 21.6 percent. Thus, the 
probability of trusting for a minority man is 3.7 percent lower than for a majority man 
on average in a typical country. However, as the gini increases by 0.1, the negative 
effect of being a member of a minority increases by 1 percent (from 3.7 percent to 4.7 
percent). The negative effect of minority status is smaller in more equal societies and 
in countries with higher political rights scores, yet larger in countries with higher per 
capita income. The minority effect is not affected by corruption or ethnic diversity. 
Although the level of economic development (per capita income) is insignificant 
for social trust on average across countries, it explains some of the variation in the 
income, education, and rural effects. The positive effect of income and education on 
trust is magnified in richer countries, but the positive rural effect decreases as per 
capita income increases. Variations in other level-1 coefficients were not well 
explained by level-2 variables.  
Model 2 included the proportion of the Catholic population to explain the level-1 
intercept. Although being a Catholic has no significant effect within countries (at 
level-1), the proportion of the Catholic population is significantly negatively 
associated with the level of social trust across countries (at level-2). Other religions 
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are insignificant at level-2. Thus, the proportion of the Protestant population does not 
make a difference across countries, although Protestants are significantly more 
trusting within countries. Inclusion of the Catholic population does not affect the 
significance of income inequality and democracy, but makes control of corruption 
insignificant.  
   Model 3 includes both the measure of skewness (ln mean/median ratio) and 
dispersion (ln 20/20 ratio) of income distribution to explain the level-1 intercept. The 
purpose is to see whether the inequality effect is primarily driven by skewness or 
dispersion. It turns out that the skewness effect is significantly negative even when 
dispersion is controlled for. This does not mean that income dispersion is insignificant 
for social trust, because the insignificance may be due to multicollinearity from the 
high correlation between skewness and dispersion (r=0.81). Dispersion is also 
significantly negative when skewness is not included together. Recall my earlier 
argument that skewness of income distribution is unambiguously unfair, while certain 
levels of dispersion may be claimed to be fair. The negative effect of skewness is 
consistent with the prediction of the fairness explanation, but contrary to that of the 
similarity explanation. 
Also, model 3 includes the political trust variable at level-1. Political trust 
(confidence in public institutions) is significantly positively associated with social 
trust, even after individual and country differences are accounted for. An increase of 
political trust by 1 (out of 1 to 4 scale) translates into an increase of trusting by 6 
percent for a typical man, other things being equal. Thus, political trust and social 
trust are closely correlated at the individual level, consistent with Brehm and Rahn 
(1997), although the correlation may not be significant at the country level (Norris 
2002). 
2) Further inspections and robustness checks: It will be useful to look into the 
income effect in more detail, because the similarity and fairness explanations 
produced different predictions about it. The similarity explanation predicts people in 
the middle of the distribution should be most trusting, so there should be a non-linear 
effect of income on trust. However, the quadratic term was not significant, and social 
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trust is found to increase almost monotonically with income. 
 
   
Figure 2.  Trust by Income Group
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Figure 2 demonstrates that the distribution of income group and percentage of 
trusting people within each income group is uncorrelated. Although people who report 
they belong to the 9th and top income decile are relatively few and most other people 
are thought to have quite different levels of income, they are far more trusting than 
those people who subjectively belong to the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th income decile and are 
surround by a lot of people with similar level of income. The figure shows that the top 
income group is slightly less trusting than the 9th group, and this may reflect a little bit 
of heterogeneity effect. However, the difference is too small to be significant. Thus, 
the evidence favors the fairness hypothesis over the similarity hypothesis. 
Although per capita income (average for 1971-96, in constant US dollars) is not 
significant with controls (Table 3), it has quite a high simple correlation with social 
trust at the country-level (r=0.38). In order to detect a possible non-linear effect, I 
looked at the two-way scatter plot and included a quadratic term in the multi-level 
analysis. There was no significant non-linear relationship. Thus, relative income 
within countries matters, but average income level of a country does not matter, other 
things being equal.  
The apparent insignificance of ethnic fractionalization (Fearon’s measure) also 
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requires further examination. Various measures of fractionalization such as Fearon’s 
cultural fractionalization measure and Alesina et al.’s measures of ethnic, linguistic, 
and religious fractionalization were not significant in the multi-level analysis. 
According to Table A1 (in the Appendix), the simple correlation with mean social 
trust at the country level is significant only for ethnic fractionalization (both Fearon’s 
and Alesina et al.’s measures). Alesina et al’s measures of linguistic and religious 
fractionalization are not significant, as Dehley and Newton (2004) also found. It is 
striking that Fearon’s measure of cultural fractionalization, which incorporated 
cultural distance between ethnic groups, has no significant simple correlation with 
social trust. I further tested whether interaction terms between ethnic diversity and 
corruption or inequality were significant, but they were not. 
The insignificance of ethnic fractionalization with controls does not necessarily 
mean that ethnic diversity has no effect on social trust. Ethnic diversity could affect 
social trust indirectly by increasing inequality and corruption. However, it is notable 
that both ethnic and cultural diversity lose significance once either corruption or 
inequality is accounted for. 
Finally, I conducted a variety of other robustness checks to make sure that the 
findings from my multi-level analysis are not spurious. I ran the same models based 
on listwise deletion. I ran the same models separately for the 1995-97 and 1999-2001 
data. I also experimented with more conventional methods such as logit regressions 
with both level-1 and level-2 data and OLS regressions at level-2. All these checks 
produced roughly consistent results. 
3) Predictors of political trust, norms and perceptions of trustworthiness: 
Model 3 in Table 3 showed that political trust is strongly and significantly associated 
with social trust at the individual level. Inclusion of additional variables, such as the 
perceived extent of corruption, voluntary organizational membership, the belief that 
bribery can be justified, and the perception that the country is run by a few big 
interests, reduced the coefficient for political trust somewhat, but political trust was 
still very significant. Also, all these additional variables were highly significant with 
predicted signs. Thus, norms of trustworthiness (bribery justified) and perceptions of 
 27
trustworthiness and fairness (perceived extent of corruption, run by big interests) 
somehow seem to be mediating variables between the fairness of a society (corruption 
and inequality) and social trust.  
In order to test this interpretation, I conducted hierarchical analyses for correlates 
of political trust and norms and perceptions of trustworthiness. The results are 
presented in Table 4. A hierarchical linear model was used for the three dependent 
variables political trust, perceived extent of corruption, and “bribe justified,” and a 
hierarchical logit model was employed for the binary dependent variable, “run by big 
interests.” 
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Table 4. Multi-level Results for Predictors of Political Trust, Norms, and Perceptions
Dependent Variable:           Political Trust Perceived Corruption     Bribe Justified Run by Big Interests
Linear/Logit Model:        Linear (Model 4)     Linear (Model 5)   Linear (Model 6)     Logit (Model 7)
Individual-level effects:
Intercept 2.3457 *** 2.8851 *** 1.9196 *** 0.7430 ***
(0.0256) (0.0326) (0.0667) (0.0766)
Age -0.0034 ** 0.0013 -0.0202 *** 0.0031
(0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0021)
Age squared 0.000070 *** -0.000037 ** 0.000107 *** -0.000065 **
(0.000011) (0.000014) (0.000024) (0.000024)
Subjective Income 0.0017 -0.0080 ** 0.0040 -0.0085
(0.0017) (0.0027) (0.0050) (0.0077)
Education -0.0217 *** -0.0193 ** -0.0375 *** 0.0454 ***
(0.0043) (0.0069) (0.0057) (0.0053)
Female 0.0048 0.0180 * -0.1452 *** -0.0114
(0.0073) (0.0086) (0.0150) (0.0190)
Unemployed -0.0412 *** 0.0589 *** 0.1325 *** -0.0436
(0.0099) (0.0112) (0.0232) (0.0296)
Rural 0.0737 *** -0.0305 -0.0506 ** -0.0686 *
(0.0092) (0.0204) (0.0191) (0.0314)
Minority 0.0035 0.0492 * 0.0489 -0.0649
(0.0231) (0.0196) (0.0327) (0.0647)
Catholic 0.0885 *** -0.0560 ** -0.0414 -0.0866
(0.0172) (0.0175) (0.0379) (0.0456)
Protestant 0.1210 *** -0.0780 ** -0.1633 *** -0.1243 **
(0.0191) (0.0241) (0.0360) (0.0472)
Orthodox 0.0608 ** 0.0373 -0.1476 *** 0.1525 *
(0.0209) (0.0314) (0.0441) (0.0772)
Muslim 0.1595 *** -0.0444 -0.1070 0.1905 **
(0.0340) (0.0246) (0.0669) (0.0600)
Other Religion 0.0701 *** -0.0010 -0.1619 *** -0.0407
(0.0154) (0.0209) (0.0343) (0.0564)
No Religion (Reference category)
Country-level effects:  On Intercept On Minority        On Intercept       On Intercept      On Intercept
Control of Corruption 0.2932*** 0.0564 -0.2889 *** -0.2414 ** -0.6960 ***
(0.0491) (0.0489) (0.0435) (0.0756) (0.1340)
Political Rights 0.0024 0.0256 0.0045 0.0069 0.0569
(0.0204) (0.0156) (0.0159) (0.0324) (0.0610)
ln GDP per capita -0.2449*** -0.1044* 0.0665 ** 0.0754 0.3449 ***
(0.0341) (0.0414) (0.0256) (0.0699) (0.0868)
Gini -0.0206 -0.5761* 0.0151 0.3911 1.5259 *
(0.2382) (0.2383) (0.2230) (0.5661) (0.7559)
Ethnic Fractionalization-0.0457 -0.1071 0.0089 -0.0881 -0.0460
(0.1047) (0.1106) (0.0850) (0.2211) (0.2875)
Note : Sample size: 176,307 individuals, 80 countries, except for perceived corruption (80,016 individuals, 50 countries).
For perceived corruption, only the 1995-97 WVS data was used. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p<.05,  ** p<.01,  *** p<.001
   
Table 4 demonstrates that political trust is highly affected by corruption. 
According to model 4, a one standard deviation increase in the control of corruption 
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indicator is associated with an 0.47 standard deviation increase in political trust 
(standard deviation = 0.63) for a typical man. Interestingly, per capita income is 
negatively associated with political trust. Income inequality is not significant for the 
level-1 intercept once corruption is controlled for. However, inequality has a negative 
effect on the minority’s political trust. Minority people have no significantly different 
level of political trust from majority people on average, but political trust of minority 
groups is lower in more unequal countries. 
Model 5 shows that, not surprisingly, the control of corruption indicator has a 
very high correlation with perception of corruption. The level of economic 
development is associated with higher perception of corruption when the control of 
corruption indicator is accounted for, although it has a negative simple correlation 
with perceived corruption. The belief that bribery can be justified is significantly 
higher in more corrupt countries (model 6), and the perception that the country is run 
by a few big interests is significantly higher in more corrupt and unequal societies 
(model 7). All these findings support the hypothesis that fairness of social and 
political institutions, in particular corruption and income inequality, affect the norms 
and perceptions of trustworthiness, and thereby social trust. But as Table 4 shows, 
ethnic diversity has no significant effect on political trust or norms and perceptions of 
trustworthiness controlling for other factors. 
 4) Possibility of reverse causation: So far, out of the eight pairs of competing 
hypotheses in Table 2 that were tested empirically, the results for seven pairs (except 
hypothesis-pair 3) support the fairness explanation and none supports the similarity 
explanation. For hypothesis-pair 3, I could not find direct evidence for an interaction 
effect between ethnic diversity and fairness (corruption or inequality), but the 
significant interaction effect between minority effect and fairness (inequality or 
democracy) indirectly supports the former hypothesis.  
Although fairness has strong explanatory power using a variety of empirical tests, 
I have not established the causal direction. In order to establish the direction of 
causality and obtain unbiased estimates of the effects of income inequality, democracy, 
and corruption on social trust, we need to have either a long period of panel data or 
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good instruments for these endogenous variables. Since neither adequate longitudinal 
data 15  nor convincing instrumental variables are available, I tested multiple 
implications of the competing theories to see which theory best fits the data. 
Social trust is likely to affect corruption and inequality, because non-trusting 
people are less likely to stick to the rules of the game and societies with higher social 
trust may find it easier to reach consensus on extensive redistribution. Indeed, the 
social trust variable is significant across countries in both corruption regression and 
inequality regression, as Table A2 in the Appendix indicates. Although these OLS 
regressions do not establish causal direction, it is unlikely that the statistically 
significant and substantively large coefficients for social trust in these regressions 
purely reflect reverse causation.  
Corruption, inequality, and social trust are all likely to have considerable 
measurement error. Measurement error will bias the coefficients for corruption and 
inequality toward zero in the social trust regressions, and the coefficient for social 
trust will also be underestimated in the corruption regression and inequality regression. 
Although reverse causality will cause them to be overestimated, the simultaneity bias 
(due to reverse causation) and the attenuation bias (due to measurement error) tend to 
offset each other. We cannot know which bias is larger, but their offsetting effects will 
reduce the net bias in the coefficients.  
Although it is very difficult to sort out this “chicken-and-egg” problem, it seems 
that causation runs both ways from corruption and inequality to erosion of trust and 
from lack of social trust to corruption and inequality. Thus, countries may be trapped 
in vicious circles of inequality, corruption, and distrust or they may proceed along 
virtuous circles of equality, freedom from corruption, and trust.  
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
I have argued that the fairness of political and legal institutions and of social 
                                                        
15 Uslaner (2004) conducted longitudinal analysis. However, social trust as well as corruption 
tends to change little over time within countries. So, the change in social trust and corruption 
in his data may reflect the noise rather than the true change. 
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conditions affects incentives for trustworthy behavior, social norms regarding such 
behavior, and people’s propensity to trust. In particular, three kinds of fairness matter: 
formal justice (freedom from corruption and equal treatment before the law), 
procedural justice (democracy and equal political rights), and distributive justice (a 
relatively equal and unskewed distribution of income). I suggested that the negative 
effect of income inequality on social trust may be due to people’s sense of unfairness 
rather than to differences in income among people. I also suggested the negative 
effect of ethnic and cultural diversity on social trust may depend on the 
fairness/unfairness of ethnic relations and the society. 
Based on multi-level analysis, using the WVS/EVS data (1995-97 and 
1999-2001) and various country indicators, I find that freedom from corruption 
(formal justice), income equality (distributive justice), and full and mature democracy 
as political equality (procedural justice) are significantly positively associated with 
social trust across countries, while the level of economic development (per capita 
income) and ethnic/cultural fractionalization are insignificant controlling for 
corruption and inequality. Also, I find evidence that corruption and inequality have an 
adverse impact on norms and perceptions of trustworthiness as well as political trust 
and that these norms, perceptions, and political trust affect social trust. 
In the economic realm, what matters for social trust is the distribution of income 
rather than the average income of the people in the country. Although individuals’ 
relative income  is significantly positively associated with their propensity to trust, 
per capita income of the country one lives in has no significant effect controlling for 
other country characteristics.  
Higher-income is associated with higher trust, and people with middle-level 
income are no more trusting than rich people, contrary to the prediction of the 
similarity hypothesis but consistent with the fairness hypothesis. The negative effect 
of inequality on trust is more related to skewedness (unfairness) than to dispersion 
(heterogeneity) of income. These findings also support the fairness/unfairness 
explanation rather than the “aversion to heterogeneity” explanation based on 
similarity/dissimilarity of incomes among people.  
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Although ethnic and cultural diversity is significant for social trust without 
controls, it is insignificant once corruption or inequality is accounted for. Also, the 
negative effect of minority status is greater in more unequal and undemocratic 
countries. This finding suggests that (perceptions of) the fairness/unfairness of ethnic 
relations in the whole society is more important for social trust than the degree of 
ethnic diversity. Alesina and La Ferrara’s (2002) finding that ethnic fractionalization 
is not significant while racial fractionalization is highly significant in the US may be 
explained by the different degrees of perceived fairness/unfairness in Black-White 
racial relations and other ethnic relations.  
The policy implications of these findings are important. We need to be concerned 
about income distribution, in particular the skewedness of the distribution, and not 
just economic growth. Indeed, improving the distribution of income may also 
contribute to economic growth in the long run via enhanced social trust (Zak and 
Knack 2001). Removing racial and ethnic discrimination, reducing income inequality 
between races and ethnicities, and encouraging political participation of minority 
groups may have positive effects on social trust in the long run. We cannot deny that 
ethnic and cultural diversity poses a significant challenge in terms of social trust and 
economic and political solidarity. But my findings suggest that the challenges of 
diversity are not insurmountable and that building a fair society, or reducing 
corruption and inequality, is much more important than sustaining a homogeneous 
society. 
Although I was unable to sort out the “chicken-and-egg” problem, it seems likely 
that causation runs both ways from corruption and inequality to erosion of trust and 
from social distrust to corruption and inequality. The problem is then how to reverse 
the vicious circles of “high inequality, high corruption, and low trust” in which many 
countries are trapped. This requires further research about the role of democracy, 
political institutions, and social policy.  
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Appendix 
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics and Simple Correlations with Social Trust
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Correlation 
with Trust
Individual Characteristics:
Social Trust 169334 0.265 0.442 0 1 1
Political Trust 169386 2.421 0.655 1 4 0.090 ***
Perceived Corruption 66447 2.904 0.833 1 4 -0.139 ***
Bribe Justified 166233 1.708 1.689 1 10 -0.030 ***
Run by Big Interests 114173 0.699 0.459 0 1 -0.073 ***
Voluntary Membership 75682 0.000 0.000 0 9 0.081 ***
Subjective Income 149823 4.643 2.538 1 10 0.100 ***
Education 169575 3.163 1.525 1 6 0.066 ***
Female 176215 0.519 0.500 0 1 -0.012 ***
Age 167146 41.126 16.243 15 101 0.028 ***
Unemployed 169434 0.095 0.293 0 1 -0.042 ***
Rural Residence 139470 0.345 0.475 0 1 0.015 ***
Minority 87253 0.135 0.342 0 1 -0.042 ***
Catholic 170489 0.327 0.469 0 1 -0.073 ***
Protestant 170489 0.128 0.334 0 1 0.076 ***
Orthodox 170489 0.116 0.321 0 1 -0.033 ***
Mslim 170489 0.142 0.350 0 1 0.006 *
Other Religion 170489 0.086 0.281 0 1 0.017 ***
No Religion 170489 0.200 0.400 0 1 0.031 ***
Optimism 58508 0.527 0.499 0 1 0.104 ***
Sense of control 161556 6.605 2.526 1 10 0.042 ***
Country Characteristics:
Mean Social Trust 80 0.284 0.145 0.047 0.653 1
Gini 73 0.340 0.099 0.173 0.588 -0.361 ***
ln (mean/median) 70 0.236 0.164 0.051 0.762 -0.507 ***
ln (20/20 ratio) 70 1.911 0.529 1.076 3.304 -0.342 ***
Control of Corruption 80 0.419 1.076 -1.062 2.329 0.506 ***
Political Rights 80 4.326 1.985 1.080 7 0.355 **
ln (GDP per capita) 80 8.149 1.469 5.201 10.615 0.376 **
 (Fearon's measures of diversity)
Ethnic Fractionalization 76 0.376 0.238 0.004 0.953 -0.2649 *
Cultural Fractionalization 76 0.240 0.179 0.000 0.667 -0.0547
 (Alesina et al.'s measures of diversity)
Ethnic Fractionalization 79 0.354 0.232 0.002 0.930 -0.2846 *
Linguistic Fractionalizatio 79 0.317 0.265 0.002 0.923 -0.0878
Religious Fractionalizatio 80 0.428 0.229 0.004 0.860 0.0319
* p<.05,  ** p<.01,  *** p<.001
Note : The maximum of correlation of individual-level variables with social trust (dummy) is
not 1, while that of country-level variables with mean social trust (continuous variable) is 1.  
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Table A2. The effects of social trust on inequality and corruption at country-level (OLS results)
             Dependent variable:               Gini  (1990s)                       CPI  (1996-2002)  
Independent variables Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
Social trust -25.8790 -2.51 2.6611 1.94
CPI (96-98) -1.2250 -1.91 -1.6880 -2.64
Gini (71-96) -0.0335 -2.3 -0.0405 -3.08
ln GDPpc (71-96) -0.7857 -0.71 -0.6545 -0.57 0.8753 4.79 0.8373 4.61
Pol rights (72-96) -0.6782 -0.69 -0.9017 -0.87 0.0015 0.01 0.0260 0.18
Trade/GDP (1971-96) -2.2423 -1.27 -1.5428 -0.79 0.3365 1.16 0.4036 1.43
Percentage Protestant 0.2269 3.72 0.2160 3.47 0.0253 2.52 0.0279 2.82
French legal origin 0.6309 0.29 0.5069 0.22 -0.7001 -2.5 -0.7551 -2.6
Socialist legal origin -11.1863 -3.06 -13.5655 -4.22 -1.8426 -2.91 -2.0129 -3.29
German legal origin -5.6808 -1.6 -10.1997 -3.11 -1.4481 -2.56 -1.2830 -2.22
Scandinavian origin -11.8716 -1.97 -19.1240 -3.44 -1.2218 -1.43 -0.7399 -0.8
Federalism 0.3223 0.11 -1.5765 -0.5 0.0235 0.07 0.0264 0.08
Natural resource exports -0.0093 -0.58 -0.0035 -0.23 -0.0064 -1 -0.0070 -1.11
Ethnolingustic fractionalization 0.8723 0.18 1.0087 0.21 -0.9020 -1.25 -0.9329 -1.23
Constant 66.2163 6.71 60.9812 6.16 -2.3108 -1.31 -1.3408 -0.73
N 114 114 102 102
R2 0.5590 0.5292 0.8275 0.8190  
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